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Abstract—Access control management is an integral part of
maintaining the security of an application. Although there has
been significant work in the field of cloud access control mecha-
nisms, however, with the advent of Distributed Ledger Technology
(DLT), on-chain access control management frameworks hardly
exist. Existing access control management mechanisms are tightly
coupled with the business logic, resulting in governance issues,
non-coherent with existing Identity Management Solutions, low
security, and compromised usability.
We propose a novel framework to implement dynamic role-
based access control for decentralized applications (dApps). The
framework allows for managing access control on a dApp,
which is completely decoupled from the business application
and integrates seamlessly with any dApps. The smart contract
architecture allows for the independent management of business
logic and execution of access control policies. It also facilitates
secure, low cost, and a high degree of flexibility of access control
management. The proposed framework promotes decentralized
governance of access control policies and efficient smart contract
upgrades. This paper also provides performance comparison
with adjacent access control frameworks for DLT. Any Turing
complete smart contract programming language is an excellent
fit to implement the framework. We expect this framework to
benefit enterprise and non-enterprise dApps and provide greater
access control flexibility and effective integration with traditional
and state of the art identity management solutions.
Index Terms—dlt, blockchain, access control, authorization,
security, confidentiality, rbac, dynamic rbac
I. INTRODUCTION
For the past few years, Distributed Ledger Technology
(DLT) and decentralized applications (dApps) have revolu-
tionized how businesses are imagined. The proliferation of
enterprise systems bring sophistication into modern day to
day transactions. Transactions today are bound across mul-
tiple systems. Conventional information security practices are
challenging to adhere to while building and maintaining such
complex systems. DLT promises to simplify some of these
sophistications.
DLT acts as a shared, immutable ledger between these
systems, offering a single source of truth for exchanged
data. However, concerns around information security, espe-
cially data confidentiality laws and regulations with based
DLT systems have become one of the disinclinations towards
enterprise DLT adoption [1] [2]. Two of the core defining
characteristics of information security triad (Confidentiality,
Integrity, and Availability) are confidentiality and integrity [3],
access control is critical to preserve these characteristics. Over
the last few decades, there have been several advances in the
area of access control mechanisms.
Access control defines and constrains what a user can
do in a system. In other words, it authorizes the user for certain
activities that s/he wishes to perform. Although, access control
can take numerous forms [3] in addition to what users can
do, like when and how the resources might be used, manual
interventions like voting before granting access to specific
resources.
Computation, whether a particular user has certain
rights to access resources, usually happens in a siloed and
insecure computational context in current cloud/on-premise
solutions. With the advent of DLT, secure multiparty computa-
tion is now possible backed by consensus among participants
on the outcome of the computation. Since data and code both
reside on an immutable shared ledger, secure, tamper-proof
computation is burgeoning. Access control of shared data on a
DLT is essential due to compliance with information security
needs, as described above. Two of the widely accepted and
used Blockchain platforms, namely Hyperledger Fabric [4] and
Ethereum [5], supports access control mechanisms in smart
contracts. However, they fall short in the following areas:
1) Tight coupling with the source code of the contract
Roles often need to be tightly bound with the function-
alities [6] [7] [8].
2) Lacks dynamism
Upgrading roles, granting and revoking permissions for
a role is often cumbersome, leading to source code
change and smart contract redeployment, as role-based
or attribute-based access control is often performed
inside the target function. For example, modifiers in
solidity [9] are applied at the target source code site,
i.e. along with the function definition.
3) Governance Chaos
Governance mechanisms need to be re-executed every
time on the deployment of the updated contract. For
example, a change in either of roles, permissions, or
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policy, the entire business logic needs to be reaudited,
consented with stakeholders and redeployed. These un-
necessary changes result in chaos in governing the
change management process [10].
4) Cost
Redeployment of contracts leads to gas fees (in some
cases), and expensive security audits [11].
5) Security
Security vulnerabilities may arise in executing the new
contract on old data with new permissions [12] [13].
6) Integration with Identity Management Suite
Integration and interoperability with cloud Identity Man-
agement Solutions (IdMs) becomes complicated as each
cloud provider has non-standard IdM suites with differ-
ent role definitions and attributes [14].
7) Performance Issues
Existing solutions are expensive in nature [6] as they
involve nested calls back and forth with policy execution
contracts.
8) Compromised Usability
Development usability of the contract is reduced as the
developer often has to worry about defining the correct
roles in the function definition [13].
This paper consists of the following sections. Section II
describes the problem statement formally. Section III intro-
duces our contribution. Section IV talks about the solution
called Dynamic Role-Based Access Control, and introduces the
mathematical primitives of the problem domain and describes
the policy execution for access control. Section V discusses
the solution architecture and contextualizes its solution using
Unified Modelling Language(UML) notation. Section VI dis-
cusses, interprets and describes the significance of the findings
and explores the underlying meaning of this solution. Section
VII closes the paper with the possible future directions to
enhance the solution. Finally, Section VIII summarises the
problem and the solution.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
One of the significant challenges of implementing access
control mechanisms is that the landscape of the business is
continually changing [15] [16]. Different use-cases require
specific accesses control mechanisms based on roles of users
and business workflows. Implementation access control in
a cross-organisational shared ledger requires dynamism to
accommodate these rapidly changing needs. Since Smart Con-
tract is the executable logic that resides on the immutable
ledger, access control requires to be implemented here.
The smart contract logic is often meant to focus on
operations and core business logic on the shared data. This
shared data is stored as a global state along with the operations
that can be performed on it. In reality, the semantics of todays
smart contract languages allow access control to applied at
a much lower level in the business logic itself. Change in
access control rules requires touching business logic code. For
example, modifiers in Solidity [17] are applied while defining a
function or using attribute-based access control in Hyperledger
Fabric chaincode allows performing checks about the target
function level [18].
This intertwined identity and access control code with
the business logic allows for less flexibility to change the
access control rules or the business logic independently. This
kind of tightly coupled [19] code leads to violation of the
single responsibility principle [19]. As a consequence, several
problems like increased cost of redeployments and audits,
approval, governance and voting chaos, performance, usability,
and other issues (as described above) arise.
III. OUR CONTRIBUTION
This solution framework described in this paper (henceforth
referred to as solution) aims to tackle the problems described
above. We tackle to problem of high coupling [19] by using
a permissions manager contract to check the user details, the
role s/he possesses, the function s/he is trying to access, and
based on a set of dynamically configured rules, the call is
delegated to the target contract at runtime. The business logic
is decoupled from the access control code. Smart contracts
can be dynamically added, and the permissions manager
contract can be configured at runtime with the whereabouts,
the functions definitions, and the roles that can access the
respective functions
The solution also allows provisioning for dynamically
adding users, user-role mappings, and function-role mappings.
This sort of loosely coupled [19] design allows for dynamic
upgrade [20] and configuration of smart contracts and roles
without the additional cost, governance problems, perfor-
mance, and usability issues.
IV. DYNAMIC ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL
Dynamic Role-Based Access Control is inspired by PERM
Modelling Language [21]. It provides a generic solution
framework to define permissions in a smart contract. The
mathematical primitives of the entity sets like roles, users,
policies and resources, are first defined in an agnostic manner
such that it fits any smart contract language irrespective of the
blockchain platform. Next, the management of these entity
sets are described. Finally, how these entity sets are used to
execute a policy at runtime is elaborated.
A. Primitives
The following section defines the primitives used to define
role based access control through the rest of the paper.
1) A User is an entity and the set U = {u1, u2, , un} is a
finite set of n users
2) A Role is an entity and the set R = {r1, r2, , rp} is a
finite set of p roles
3) A Function is an entity and the set F = {f1, f2, , fq}
is a finite set of q functions
4) The relation between F and R is defined by FR : R −→
F , a many-to-many mapping consisting of the functions
that can be accessed by different roles and is called the
function-role mapping
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Fig. 1. Block Diagram of the Solution Framework
5) The relation between U and R is defined by UR : U −→
R a many-to-many mapping consisting of the roles that
users possess and is called the user-role mapping
6) A request Req consists of a tuple Req = (ui, fj) where
ui ∈ U,∀i = {1, 2, ..., n} and fj ∈ F,∀j = {1, 2, ..., q}
B. Policy Execution
The policy is executed whenever a user tries to access a
function in the contract. The request defined by Req arrives
at the system; the target contract accepts the request and
delegates it to the Permission Manager which breaks down
the request tuple attributes into the ui and fj .
If ui ∈ U , we find the range/co-domain of ui from UR.
Let the range be ri ⊆ R.
If fj ∈ F , we find the range/co-domain of fj from FR.
Let the range be rj ⊆ R.
To execute the policy, we simply check ri ∩ rj 6= φ.
V. SOLUTION ARCHITECTURE
We implement the mathematical concepts demonstrated
previously using UML.
The block diagram of the solution is represented in figure
1. It shows a layered diagram of the different manager compo-
nents forming the architecture of the system. The description
of each of these manager components are described below.
1) Role Manager: Manages roles in the system, i.e. R.
2) Function Manager: Manages functions in the system,
i.e. F
3) User Manager: Manages users and roles possessed by
the users i.e., U and UR
4) Policy Manager: Manages roles that are eligible to
access a function, i.e., FR
5) Permissions Manager: Orchestrates the flow among the
Role, Function, User and Policy Manager, validate the
flow and output a boolean response.
The manager components cater to the following require-
ments:
1) Adding, updating, fetching, checking existence and dis-
posing of different entities from the system, viz. roles,
functions, users and policies.
2) Maintains consistency of data. For example, any role
that is linked to any user or function cannot be disposed
or altered accidentally.
3) Allows for capturing comprehensive information about
the entities Role, Function, User, and Policy. For exam-
ple the Policy Manager can decide if an user is required
to have m out of p roles to grant access to a function.
4) Decoupled flow control aiding in smoother management
and governance. For example, in case of a change in
role management logic, only the role component can
be replaced with the data of roles intact. This type
of decoupling can be achieved using Eternal Storage
Design Pattern [22] in Solidity programming language.
5) The decoupled approach also leads to optimized deploy-
ment and storage costs
6) Independent and Fine grained control over each man-
agement component. For example: A group of super
administrators, say Group A can manage Roles and
Users, while Group B can manage Policies, and finally
Group C can vet and approve the changes. Such complex
governance is cumbersome and challenging to achieve
using conventional access control techniques.
We define the entities and the Application Programming
Interfaces (APIs) for the described manager components in
Object-Oriented Programming (OOP) paradigm using a class
diagram, as shown in figure 2.
The sequence of events that follow the policy exe-
cution described above is depicted in the sequence diagram in
figure 3.
1) The user invokes a function fj with certain arguments.
The user identity ui also flows along and lands in the
target smart contract.
2) The target contract delegates these arguments to the
Permissions Manager
3) The Permissions Manager gets the details of the user ui,
more specifically the roles the user possess (say ri)
4) The Permissions Manager checks is any policy mapping
exists with the Policy manager by passing the function
fj and the roles ri
5) The Policy Manager iterates over the set of roles as-
signed to fj (say rj) and returns true if a match exists
between the sets ri and rj or false otherwise
UserManager
- userId: string
- userName: string
- roles: string [ ]
+ addUser(User user): void
+ updateUser(User user): boolean
+ getUser(string userId): User
+ isUser(string userId): boolean
+ deleteUser(string userId): boolean
RoleManager
- roleId: string
- roleName: string
+ addRole(Role role): void
+ updateRole(Role role): boolean
+ getRole(string roleId): Role
+ isRole(string roleId): boolean
+ deleteRole(string roleId): boolean
FunctionManager
- functionId: string
- functionSignature: string
+ addFunction(Function function): void
+ updateFunction(Function function): boolean
+ getFunction(string functionId): Function
+ isFunction(string functionId): boolean
+ deleteFunction(string functionId): boolean
PolicyManager
- functionId : string
- roleId: string
+ addPolicy(string functionId, string roleId): void
+ deletePolicy(string functionId, string roleId): boolean
+ checkPolicyExists(string functionId, string roleId): boolean
PermissionsManager
+ checkPermission(string userId, string functionId): boolean
Fig. 2. UML Class Diagram of the Solution Framework
6) The decision is propagated back to the target contract,
where it resumes execution in case of a Boolean true
response or throws an Authorization error otherwise
For the sake of brevity, the following checks from the
request Req are omitted from the sequence diagram:
1) Existence of user ui ∈ U
2) Existence of function fj ∈ F
3) Existence of role rp ∈ R
VI. DISCUSSION
The solution approaches the well-known problem of role-
based access control from the perspective of a decentral-
ized context. It takes into consideration that multiple parties
involved in the ledger are unknown, and each resource or
function has a set of well-defined access-control rules called
policies against which parties have access permissions to
perform specific actions. It offers a dynamic perspective, con-
sidering the need for flexibility and control over authorization.
[1]. It also looks at the need for having a mechanism to
update the data and the actions on the data (code) in a flexible
manner and avoiding substantial code changes every time. This
mechanism is particularly useful when the deployed code, as
access control rules are subject to change, mainly for the two
reasons. First is the dynamic landscape of business, and second
is the lack of mature formal verification methods of smart
contracts [23].
Moreover, since ledger writes can only be updated and
not reverted or deleted. The logical separation of code or
actions and the data is necessary. The loose coupling demon-
strated of each of the entities shown the Solution Architecture
discussed in the paper allows for such flexibility and precise
control over access control.
Additionally, the approach described aids in implement-
ing a decentralized change management process [10]. For
example, a voting mechanism can be implemented to allow
specific changes in policies to take effect, with zero change in
disjoint contracts or logic, also leaving less room for any chaos
in governance. The approach also leads to better usability of
the core business logic contracts allowing them to change
independently, without the developer having to worry about
the roles and permissions allowed for the given smart contract
function.
The current approach supports implementation in Gen-
eration 2 blockchain solutions like Ethereum and Hyperledger
Fabric. We have implemented the solution in Solidity pro-
gramming language (version 0.5.11) for Ethereum Virtual
Machine. Below are some quantitative comparisons of our
implementation vis--vis OpenZeppelins implementation for
Access Control [6]. Below are two important observations:
1) Unit Deployment costs for our solution are higher than
OpenZeppelins solution. However, when we compare
it to the number of upgrades (say NUG) in the overall
lifecycle of a contract, due to changes in business logic,
access control, users, and policies in an enterprise
context, our solution is deployed once and hence
economical. However, the solution from OpenZeppelin
requires re-deployment for every change in role or
policies leading to higher long term costs. Moreover,
OpenZeppelin requires a new contract to be deployed
Dynamic Access Control Mechanism
Target Contract User Manager Policy ManagerPermissionsManager
{fn1(arg1,..argN), 
userId}
returnValue
checkPermission
(fn1,userId)
getUser(userId)
response:User
checkPolicyExists(fn1,role)
response:boolean
response:false
error
opt: 
if (response)
opt: 
if (!response)
response:true
loop:
for(role in User.roles)
opt: 
if (response)
Fig. 3. UML Sequence Diagram of the Solution Framework
every time a new role is added into the system,
thereby making the contracts, even more, costlier for
multiple roles than our solution. Table I summarises
the approximate costs of deploying the same contract
for one role and NR roles. It also compares the cost of
upgrading the contract NUG times.
We can, therefore, see the costs for our solution
are constant if we extrapolate it for NR roles and
NUG upgrades, whereas it increases linearly for Open
Zeppelins solution.
2) Our solution fares better for long term transaction cost
efficiency. One time transaction Costs (Gas Used) for
our solution are approximately 40% higher than Open-
Zeppelins solution. However, the cost for OpenZep-
pelin’s solution increases linearly when more roles are
added, and complex computation needs to be executed
when checking role access to a function. The lack of
dynamism in OpenZeppelin’s solution as discussed in
Section I is chiefly responsible for this linear increase in
transaction cost. In contrast to this, the transaction costs
for our solution viz. costs for checking access remains
constant even when scaled for multiple role checks.
VII. FUTURE WORK
Some of the means how the described solution is extensible
in the future are as follows:
1) The policy manager is extensible to evaluate sophisti-
cated policies. For example, the policy manager can be
improvised to consider the roles and permissions of the
organization while evaluating the policies at runtime.
TABLE I
DEPLOYMENT COST COMPARISON FOR OUR SOLUTION VS.
OPENZEPPELIN’S SOLUTION
Our Solution OpenZeppelinsSolution
One Time Deployment Cost
for One Role and Zero
Upgrades (Gas Used)
∼9536190 ∼359268
Deployment costs for
NR roles witg NUG
upgrades (Gas Used)
∼9536190 ∼359268 x NR x NUG
2) The change mechanism can be extended to include vot-
ing to enable decentralized decision making for change
management [10].
3) The current approach requires the manual management
of functions and users in the function manager and user
manager respectively. This approach can be automated.
Automatically synchronization is possible in this case.
For example, using an identity management provider,
the user details are synchronized to the user manager.
Likewise, functions in the smart contract are automati-
cally synchronized using a source code parser to extract
and smart contract functions and synchronize with the
function manager.
4) More quantitative information about the performance
and security of the described approach can be provided.
This would help decision-makers evaluate the perfor-
mance and security of the solution before deploying it.
5) Ethereum smart contract implementations can be opti-
mized for Gas Costs. The current implementation does
not focus on gas optimization best practices.
VIII. SUMMARY
In this paper we have demonstrated an approach to solve
the problem of decentralized role-based access control. The
demonstrated mechanism is loosely coupled [19] with the
business logic allowing both the access control policies and
the business logic to change independently. This segrega-
tion of concerns allows for the following benefits: easy and
independent auditing and governance of smart contract and
its deployment, reduced costs of change management, easier
integration with cloud identity management. On a bigger scale
the mentioned approach is also easier manage. We have also
demonstrated a few observations with our implementation
compared to standard industry libraries for access control.
The presented solution framework is suited for use in both
enterprise and public dApp context. We expect this framework
to enable flexible access control management in dApps and
address specific challenges for enterprise DLT adoption.
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